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Abstract This paper seeks to address the question of schooling for democracy by, first,
identifying at least one form of social character, dependent, after Marcuse, on the historical
emergence of a ‘‘new sensibility.’’ It then explores one pedagogical thread related to the
emergence of this form of subjectivity over the course of the last two centuries in the west,
and traces its influence in the educational counter-tradition associated with philosophical
anarchism, which is based on principles of dialogue and social reconstruction as opposed to
monologue and reproduction. The idea of a dialogical school has been made possible by a
historical shift in adult views of child as interlocutor rather than ‘‘othered’’ object of adult
formation—a shift that can be observed in an historical process of ‘‘closer approaches’’
between adult and child and a recognition of childhood and adulthood as forms of subjectivity that lie on a synchronous rather than a diachronic lifespan continuum. Finally the
author identifies an archetype of ‘‘school’’ understood as a specific type of intentional
community—an experimental zone in which participants are allowed and encouraged,
through explicitly dialogical practice, to develop the personal and relational habits that
make authentic democracy possible—a communal form that gives practical meaning to
Dewey’s notion of school as ‘‘embryonic society’’: a utopian space where natality is
recognized as a fundamental cultural force, and where the evolutionary possibilities
inherent in neoteny are taken as normative.
Keywords Social anarchism  Schooling  Subjectivity  Democracy

‘‘All history is really the history of perception, and what we make history with is the matter of a becoming’’
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 347).
& David Kennedy
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In an epoch in which conditions that would appear to encourage the emergence of a vibrant
democratic polity—unprecedented access to information, instant communication, global
intervisibility, universal representation and the clear possibility of post-scarcity economies—are associated instead with its vulnerability,1 we are encouraged to think about what
form of schooling most encourages that emergence. That same question was asked early in
the nineteenth century in the US, and was answered in the form of the conventional,
‘‘universal’’ educational model represented by the American public school. Contested from
the start (Kaestle 1983), the association of the ‘‘common school’’ model with the purposes
of state, economy and ruling class was clearly stated and its anti-democratic character
identified as early as 1793, in William Godwin’s An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice.
Over 200 years later, Godwin’s analysis has received chilling vindication, as US and
global educational policy conforms reflexively to the hegemonic requirements of the
corporate and security state. Stricken with institutional amnesia, ‘‘school’’ in the late
capitalist imaginary is no longer able to understand itself as other than an ideological state
apparatus—an institution dedicated to the reproduction of the economic and political status
quo that guarantees its own narrow and authoritarian tendencies. If, in the teeth of this
striking situation of identity diffusion, we attempted to re-think schooling for democracy,
where would we begin?
This question could be explored in multiple discourses, whether economic, social, or
political. I want to approach it from a psychohistorical angle, on the assumption that one
form of historically constituted modal personality (Keniston 1965) or social character
(Fromm 1941; Adorno et al. 1950) or ‘‘sensibility’’ (Marcuse 1969) or ‘‘subjectivity’’
(Foucault 1978, 2005) is necessary if not sufficient to make authentic democracy possible.
I will argue for what I will call ‘‘democratic sensibility’’ as a form of subjectivity that
represents a positive and even critical evolutionary force in the ongoing history of the
human species. Then I want to explore one pedagogical thread that is related to the
emergence of this form of subjectivity over the course of the last two centuries in the west,
and to trace its influence in the educational counter-tradition that emerged contemporaneous with the rise of universal, state-controlled, compulsory schooling. This thread has
origins, not just in the original Athenian ideal of the polis as ekklesia or assembly, but in
the European, British and American non-conformist religious groups originally associated
with an antinomian Christian counterculture that is almost as old as Christianity itself
(Rexroth 1974; Marshall 2010, 74–107). It emerged in secular form in the late eighteenth,
nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries in pre-Marxian anarcho-socialist theory and
practice—now sometimes loosely associated in the US with ‘‘left libertarianism’’—and has
in varying degrees been expressed and articulated in the twentieth century progressive
education moment (Avrich 2006; Burke and Jones 2014; Suissa 2006; Semel and Sadovnik
1999). Its scholastic identity, characterized by its champions as ‘‘integral education’’
(Bookchin 2004, 138), is based, I will suggest, on principles of dialogue and spontaneous
social reconstruction as opposed to monologue and reproduction.
I will also suggest that the idea of a dialogical school has been made possible by a
historical shift in adult views of child as interlocutor rather than ‘‘othered’’ object of adult
formation—a shift that can be observed in an evolutionary process of ‘‘closer approaches’’
1

Democratic polity is threatened by the steady entrenchment of the Orwellian state, naked corporate-state
economic imperialism at home and abroad, extreme income inequalities, political domestication of the
mainstream citizen–consumer, legalized corruption in government and business, conditions of permanent
global war, the rise of criminal states, the normalization of terror by both state and anti-state actors,
catastrophic environmental degradation on a global scale, and perhaps most gravely, by the simulacrum of
democracy represented, for example, by US politics.
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between adult and child (deMause 1974; Kennedy 2006), and a recognition, initiated by
Freudian psychology, of childhood and adulthood as forms of subjectivity that lie on a
synchronous rather than a diachronic continuum in the lifespan. Finally, I will attempt to
identify an archetype of ‘‘school’’ understood as a specific type of intentional community—an experimental, neotenic zone in which participants are allowed and encouraged,
through explicitly dialogical practice, to develop the personal and relational habits that
make authentic democracy possible—a communal form that gives practical meaning to
Dewey’s (1991/1902) oft-cited notion of school as ‘‘embryonic society.’’ Here, ‘‘school’’
will be understood as an archetypal space for the emergence of new, evolutionary forms of
social practice.

Democratic Sensibilities
In 1916, in his seminal work Democracy and Education, Dewey made a critical distinction
between social and political democracy (87). On this account, democracy is a communicative discourse before it is a political form—an interactive style of lived experience that
is characterized by certain cognitive, affective and relational ‘‘habits’’ or ‘‘definite dispositions’’ (1916, 46)—and by the way certain key concepts such as authority, freedom,
equality, reciprocity, fairness, responsibility, privilege, compromise, right, duty, and so on
are co-constructed, valorized, and operationalized by a collective. These concepts are
active in a set of normative social habits that are, therefore, personal to the extent that they
constitute in the individual a form of subjectivity:
All habits are demands for certain kinds of activity; and they constitute the self. In
any intelligible sense of the word will they are will. They form our effective desires
and they furnish us with our working capacities. They rule our thoughts, determining
which shall appear and be strong and which shall pass from light into obscurity.
(1922, 25)
Dewey’s notion of ‘‘habits,’’ especially in their capacity for reconstruction through their
dialectical relation with ‘‘impulse’’ (Ibid), evokes what Herbert Marcuse identified as
‘‘sensibility,’’ or habits that have ‘‘sunk down’’ to the level of ‘‘instinct’’ (1969, 10)—that
is, involuntary reactions to fundamental existential situations of relationality, equality,
justice, authority, power, and political action. Marcuse’s notion of a historically emergent
‘‘new sensibility’’ (1966, 1969, 1972) invokes ‘‘a new experience of nature,’’ ‘‘the
appearance of new instinctual needs and values’’ (1969, 190) that make authentic
democratic practice possible. This assumes that ‘‘human nature’’ and even the world of
sense and perception is an emergent historical construct.
Apart from this ‘‘sensibilitization’’—which has affinities with Paulo Freire’s (1965)
concept of ‘‘conscientization’’—and until democratic habits become individually experienced, deep-seated sensitivities and inclinations—part of our most basic ‘‘needs, satisfactions, and values’’ (Marcuse 1969, 6) or ‘‘economies of desire’’ (Kahn 2009)—the
normative values that democracy represents will not emerge into effective political form.
For the democratic sensibility freedom, equity, dialogue, cooperation, negotiation and nonviolence have become somatic necessities. It is the embodied subject who experiences the
empathy and the sense of intrinsic ethical requirement that instinctively refuses hierarchy,
domination, and the arrogation of privilege by the powerful few at the expense of the
dispossessed many. This suggests a critical tension between what is and what could be
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(Bookchin 2004, 122), and the impulse toward, as Graeber (2004) has argued, ‘‘…the
creation of alternative forms of organization on a world scale, new forms of communication, new, less alienated ways of organizing life, which will, eventually, make currently
existing forms of power seem stupid and beside the point’’ (40).
Both Dewey’s and Marcuse’s analyses assume that ‘‘human nature’’ and even the world
of sense and perception is an emergent historical construct, or what Bookchin (2005) refers
to as ‘‘second nature’’ (364, 369)—a human nature always in the making. Democratic
values are virtual in the sense that they are always present as potential in any given
communicative situation, but they are never fully realized because they are normative—
what ought to be. This makes of democracy—both social and political—a praxis, in the
sense of the back and forth between ‘‘ought’’ and ‘‘is.’’ As a praxis, social democracy is an
ongoing reconstruction of of ‘‘instinctual’’ forms of engagement with and response to lived
experience. It is a (r)evolutionary praxis: evolutionary because it represents an emergent,
historical form of subjectivity (and hence morality), and revolutionary because it requires a
confrontation with the blind, compulsive patterns of cultural and endopsychic reproduction
both within oneself, within others, and within institutions; it involves a conscious choice
for the reconstruction of habits, which requires a process of self-work. And as embodied, it
is a (r)evolution in perception itself: as Deleuze and Guattari (1987) put it, ‘‘All history is
really the history of perception’’ (347). Apart from it, democratic practices lose their
efficacy and become mendacious window-dressings for plutocracy, oligarchy, kleptocracy,
and the control society (Deleuze 1992), which rules through what Sheldon Wolin (2010)
has called ‘‘inverted totalitarianism.’’
These claims put a great deal of semantic weight on the term ‘‘democracy’’—and
ontological weight as well. What they suggest is that the term stands for an evolution of
human sensibility—that it signifies a way of being in the world that is an intentional
practice, and as such assumes the form of a spiritual practice or at least a ‘‘care of the self,’’
to the extent that the latter is a conscious, deliberate form of intentionality, and of framing
one’s interaction with the world. It implies an evolved form of negotiating the given
historical relationship between individual, family, clan, tribe, nation, species and between
the human and the non-human. It depends on the development of social habits and individual sensibilities that are not fully under the control of the executive function of the
ego—in fact it might be argued that they emerge through ego relinquishment (Neumann
1973).2 What multiple promoters of social democracy (e.g. Nussbaum 2001, 2013; Rorty
1989; Bookchin 2005) consider its necessary psychological condition—‘‘sensitivity’’ or
empathy—is based on a feeling, which cannot be manufactured from or fully commanded
by a conscious normative principle or self-narrative. As such, democratic sensibility dwells
psychologically in that liminal, virtual region between the descriptive and the normative.
This is a critical region, in both the etymological and the current senses of the term
‘‘critical’’: a region in which krisis or ‘‘judgment’’ is continually called for—an either/or—
and which demands critical thinking in the sense of the kind of awareness that is capable of
turning on, interrogating and sometimes over-riding its own prior assumptions, which is
more often than not a product of both external and internal dialogue.

2

As argued by Murray Bookchin in Post-Scarcity Anarchism (2004), ‘‘the technological revolution, culminating in cybernation, has created the objective, quantitative basis for a world… free from material want,
from… the struggle with necessity…. A century ago, scarcity had to be endured: today, it has to be
enforced—hence the importance of the state in the present era… for perpetuating hierarchy, exploitation and
unfreedom’’ (2–3, 5).
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Just as it is difficult—given the situated, embodied, relational and narrative character of
lived experience—to distinguish between the social and individual aspects of subjectivity
in any given person, so it is difficult to distinguish between the individual and social
elements of any given democratic ‘‘need,’’ ‘‘satisfaction,’’ or value.’’ We might try to
understand it as made up of two levels, the personal and the political, which are mutually
informative, and in places indistinguishable. A list of personal characteristics would in turn
break down into two levels, which we could call primary and secondary. Primary characteristics include fundamental introspective awarenesses—however liminal (i.e.
‘‘threshold’’ awarenesses), emergent and transitional—that follow from a process of ego
decentering. That is, they are not necessarily fully conscious, but they underlie affect and
ideation, and they emerge as a result of lived relational experience, of which ‘‘school’’ is
one major context in childhood. I characterize them as ‘‘becomings’’ because, as argued
above, they are virtual and emergent. A simple list would include:
Becoming aware of the ambiguity of boundaries: an awareness that I and my other are
inextricably and paradoxically entrained—both separate and parts of one system. This
awareness underlies our understanding of our identity as separate or communal, and our
rights and responsibilities as individual and community, which manifests in a particular
balance between field-dependent and field independent perceptual and relational style
(Witkin and Goodenough 1977). A willingness and ability to negotiate the boundaries
between individuals and systems is, I would argue, a key factor in democratic subjectivity.
Becoming aware of binarization: this involves the understanding that binary thinking
and classification is typically an epistemological and ontological distortion, and does not
reflect the complexity of the relations within self, or between self, other and group. The
deconstruction of binaries allows for more sophisticated and complex forms of political
problem-solving.
Becoming aware of difference and multiplicity: this awareness involves the deconstruction or withdrawal of the projection of schematized categories, or what Emmanuel
Levinas referred to as projection of the ‘‘Same’’ onto the other, which is the basis for
stereotyping. It results in the increasing awareness of singularity, or the unique,
unthematizable being of things and persons, their haecceity or thisness (Deleuze and
Guattari 1987, 408), the points of tension and potentiality that are absolutely unique to
haecceities, and recognition of the ‘‘unique one… the absolute other’’ who is ‘‘‘‘always on
the verge of presence but never comes to presence.’’ (Levinas 1987, p. 68, 116) Relations
based on projection are relations of force, and commonly relations of domination, however
subtle and complex. In opening oneself to the other who ‘‘eludes thematization,’’ who
‘‘overflows absolutely every idea I can have of him,’’ one experiences ‘‘the wonder proper
to ethical significance,’’ which implicitly demands ‘‘renouncing constraint,… renouncing… force and whatever is all-powerful’’ (Ibid, 18, 12, 25).
Becoming aware of unfinishedness: our human condition, according to Freire, is an
ontological and epistemological situation of radical ‘‘unfinishedness,’’ which is the basis,
he claims, for our educability. ‘‘I am,’’ he writes, ‘‘involved with others in making history
out of possibility, not simply resigned to fatalistic stagnation. Consequently, the future is
something to be constructed through trial and error rather than an inexorable vice that
determines all our actions’’ (1998, 54). To become aware of our unfinished state, both as
individuals and as a collective condition, nourishes the hope that makes democratic forms
of relation possible.
The style in which these primary becomings of democratic sensibility are expressed is
influenced by the dialectical relation between social, cultural and familial forms of life and
individual temperamental dispositions, which can be described in the language of
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bioenergetics, or patterns of energy relationships and energy transformations: activity level,
approach-withdrawal, adaptability, threshold of sensory response, intensity of reaction,
quality of mood, etc. (Thomas and Chess 1977; Buss and Plomin 1984; Zentner and Bates
2008). That is, both genetic and cultural factors influence the way these becomings manifest
as affective and cognitive style. A person may be more or less flexible and therefore open to
change, more or less compassionate, more or less inclined to optimism or pessimism, more or
less tolerant of ambiguity, more or less of an idealist, realist or pragmatist, but these primary
becomings lie deeper than the style in which they are lived out.
Secondary personal dispositions of democratic sensibility may be said to be sentient
values that follow from the primary. They are also becomings, but manifest when we enter
relation with others and may be thought of as active relational and social beliefs: in the
imperative values of empathy, dialogue and cooperation, in toleration of difference,
intolerance of injustice, anti-tribalism, commitment to non-violence, refusal of domination,
and healthy mistrust of hierarchy, privilege and the uses of power. These sensibilities are
informed by a sense of intrinsic ethical requirement, and are mediated through the ongoing
personal and collective reconstruction of articulable concepts such as authority, freedom,
equality, reciprocity, fairness, responsibility, compromise, right, and duty. The personal
meets the political in the shared problematization, reconstruction and activation of these
concepts, which tends to happen naturally in collectively mediated contexts—particularly
in institutions such as schools—that provide an open space for an ongoing process of
dialogue, which is the engine of the becomings listed here.
Dialogue, as an open-ended encounter with an other, operates on what Bohm (1996)
refers to as a ‘‘tacit’’ non-verbal, somatic as well as a linguistic or conceptual level—Paul
Schilder (1950) speaks of a ‘‘dialogue of body images’’—and is a form, not just of
intersubjectivity but (pace Foucault) ‘‘intersubjection.’’ It assumes equality and respect; is
both a mutual and self-interrogation of assumptions, in a space marked by a normative
emphasis on impartiality and, in Foucault’s (2005) formulation, by ‘‘truth-telling’’ rather
than ‘‘flattery’’ or ‘‘rhetoric.’’ Dialogue is distinguished from conversation in that it doesn’t
revolve around mutual affirmation or comfort—it seeks out complexity and difference
rather than the same, in the interest of a dialectical movement in which deconstruction
always precedes reconstruction—in what Bohm (1996, 5) calls a ‘‘coherent movement of
thought.’’ Dialogue may be present in many discursive and expressive forms—whether
music, art, dance—both within and between discursive traditions—and as such may be
understood as a dynamic structural both curricular and governmental principle of an
intentional community such as a school.

A Genealogy of Democratic Schooling
Can one educate for the democratic sensibility? In fact this form of subjectivity could not
become a normative value unless it was virtual in all of us—children as well as adults—a
continually not-quite-yet-present, emergent possibility implicit in every actualization. As
such, there is a multitude of democratic subjects already among us, ranged along a continuum of depth and consistency, and assuming a variety of expressive forms. If we accept
dialogical self theory’s assumption of multiple self positions (Hermans and HermansKonopka 2010; Hermans and Gieser 2012; Bertau et al. 2012; Kennedy 2013b), we may
understand the democratic sensibility as one interlocutor in the intra and intersubjective
polyphonic conversation that is the ever-emerging human subject-in-process. In addition,
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its historical realization on a larger scale is causally over-determined. It is encouraged by
the real possibility of a post-scarcity economy3 (argued by Marcuse 1966, 1978 and
Bookchin 2004, 2010, and others); by whatever models of social, economic and political
freedom and relative justice do now exist in the world; by an expanding global instant
information environment resulting in ever-increasing human intervisibility, implying
greater recognition of and more approaches to difference and otherness; by the historical
rise of childhood as an interlocutor with adulthood—which may in fact be the most
important factor of all, given that it affects parenting styles, which are directly linked with
the presence or absence of the dispositions that make for differences in what Lakoff (2002)
calls ‘‘moral politics’’; and no doubt by other indirect causal factors—epidemiology,
demographics, medical progress, the effects of technologies on culture, and so on.
However, the democratic sensibility tends to be ignored or suppressed by institutional
apparatuses that function—through a mechanism characterized by Deleuze and Guattari
(1987) as ‘‘overcoding,’’4 which pushes certain habits down to the instinctual level—to
reproduce hierarchical relations of power, structural political, social and economic
inequalities, and on a personal psychological level, the ‘‘docile’’ depoliticized subject of
inverted totalitarianism. In its identity as an ideological state apparatus (Althusser 2008), the
institution of ‘‘school’’ is in fact an overcoding machine, implicitly designed for the cultural
reproduction of one version of ‘‘human nature,’’ one normative sensibility, one characteristic
and even self-stereotyped ensemble of cognitive and emotional habits—for ‘‘subjection’’ in
the double sense of forming a subject and subjecting a body to a regime of normalization
(Foucault 1978). Its features are marked by the internalization of soft authoritarian dispositions, norms and values, most recently in the form of the corporatized, ‘‘mediatized’’ subject
(Zizek 2011),5 in which individualism is encouraged but not singularity, the ‘‘me’’ but not the
‘‘I,’’ while universal surveillance (‘‘oversight’’) becomes the primary engine of governmentality. In the control society, dogmatism goes hand in hand with repressive desublimation
(Marcuse 1962), an intolerance of ambiguity and a compulsive need for closure lead to an
implicit authoritarianism, social dominance systems are considered necessary evils, and the
gloomy Hobbesian ‘‘natural condition of [hu]mankind’’ is assumed.
As such, democratic sensibility tends to develop in psychosocial spaces (which may
include, per dialogical self theory, the space of one singular individuality) that are
ignored or otherwise sheltered from the totalizing structures of the state and its
repressive discourses—and which are oriented, not to overthrow or even forcible reform,
but to their gradual replacement. As the eminent nineteenth century anarcho-socialist
Gustav Landauer put it, ‘‘The state is a condition, a certain relationship among human
beings, a mode of behavior between them; we destroy it by contracting other
3

Neumann argues that a ‘‘new ethic’’ will emerge from a recognition and acknowledgement of our own
‘‘shadow,’’ which in the Jungian scheme, is the ‘‘lion at the gate’’ of the re-unification of conscious and
unconscious elements of the personality, or ‘‘individuation.’’

4

As May (1994, 106), explains it, ‘‘In overcoding, disparate practices are brought together under a single
category or principle, and are given their comprehensibility as variations of that category or principle. What
was different becomes merely another mode of the same.’’

5

Zizek offers three ‘‘contemporary figures of the post-Cartesian subject’’—the ‘‘proletarian, the exploited
worker whose product is taken away from him, reducing him to a subjectivity without substance’’; ‘‘a totally
‘‘mediatized’’ subject, fully immersed in virtual reality–while ‘‘spontaneously’’ he thinks that he is in direct
contact with reality, his relationship to reality is in fact sustained by complex digital machinery’’ as in The
Matrix; and the ‘‘post-traumatic autistic subject: in it, we are dealing with the zero-level of subjectivity, with
the formal conversion of the pure externality of the meaningless real (its brutal destructive intrusion) into the
pure internality of the ‘‘autistic’’ subject detached from external reality, disengaged, reduced to a persisting
core deprived of all substance.’’ (2011, 311, 314).
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relationships, by behaving differently toward one another’’ (quoted in Marshall 2010,
411). The possibilities inherent in such spaces suggest Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987)
concept of ‘‘nomadism’’—a form of subjectivity and a pattern of sociability and relation
that embody what May (1994) calls ‘‘a creative but deterritorialized force.’’ Nomadic
social phenomena are ‘‘continuously creative but not bound to any given types or categories of product,’’ and provide ‘‘the possibility of conceiving new and different forms
of practice, and thus of resisting current forms of identification as unwonted constraints’’
(Ibid, 102–103). Deleuze and Guattari in fact link this to ‘‘becoming child,’’ a becoming
by which childhood is released from its biological signifiers and understood as a zone, a
region of the psyche, a way of being in time, a form of intentionality or attention, a field
of intensities and flows, affective and noetic (Deleuze and Guattari 1987; Kohan 2014;
Kennedy 2013a, 2014a).
Jan Masschelein and Maarten Simons (2014) argue that the Western ‘‘school,’’ understood from its original perspective, is a cultural invention (which they attribute to the
ancient Greek polis) that ‘‘suspends the natural order’’ of instrumental production and
reproduction in the creation of a psychosocial space of ‘‘leisure’’ or ‘‘free time’’ (Gk skole).
School as skole is ‘‘a particular form of gathering’’ (180) that provides a shelter for emergent
nomadic subjectivities; a space for what Judith Suissa (2006), in her study of anarchist
educational theory, identifies as dedicated to the promise of ‘‘creating a new society from
the seeds of aspirations, tendencies and trends already present in human action’’ (118). It is a
space intrinsically dedicated to ‘‘opening a future,’’ in which—in keeping with childhood
natality and the dialogue between generations—the emergence of new forms is possible, as
well as a space in which present forms can be critically interrogated.
The emergence of the democratic sensibility depends on a social praxis that is
founded, not on normalization and typification, but on the recognition of what Bookchin, in his formulation of social ecology, identified as a principle of organic differentiation, whereby greater diversity leads to greater balance—a principal of ‘‘unity in
diversity’’ (2004, 8; 2005, 88–98), which assumes that the greater the individuation, the
greater the social harmony. It also assumes the pragmatic necessity of individual and
social problematization in the interest of ongoing reconstruction. As such, to educate
for democracy means to reinvent ‘‘school’’ as a concept, a project and a form of
gathering in the image of dialogue, which is the normative psycholinguistic discourse
of democracy. We have precursors and prototypes of this type of school starting in the
early nineteenth century, operating as a kind of liminal or free-zone in the spaces
ignored by state-imposed universal compulsory schooling, spaces that are dedicated, in
Landauer’s formulation, to ‘‘building the new society within the shell of the old’’
(Horrox 2007; Landauer 2010; Marshall 2010). State-imposed education was originally
modeled on the prison, the military and the asylum (Foucault 1978), which established
itself in ever more bureaucratic form over the course of that same century. School as
skolé is—as a dialogic adult–child collective—a prophetic community, a ‘‘seed beneath
the snow,’’ an alternative already present in the interstices of state governmental
power—not, as Paul Goodman put it, ‘‘a new order, but an expansion of existing
spheres of free action’’ (quoted in Marshall 2010, 676).6
6

There is a grim historical logic in the fact that Johan Pestalozzi’s first school in Stanz Switzerland—
typically identified as a founding instance of dialogical education–was created to care for the orphans who
survived the Napoleonic army’s massacre of 1200 men, women and children there in 1798–given that
Napoleon’s police state was the first to create a national educational system marked by centralization,
standardization, and constant surveillance (Bowen 1981, 222, 252 ff; Gutek 1995, 225, 188–191).
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Anarchism and Education
What we call ‘‘progressive education’’ today has been deeply influenced by this model of
school as skole, which first emerged into modern historical visibility in the steady rise of
anti-authoritarian thought and practice that characterized late eighteenth century and
nineteenth century Europe and the early twentieth century Americas. Democratic, dialogical educational theory had its original modern impulse in radical Enlightenment
thought and nineteenth century revolutionary aspirations. On a deeper, psychohistorical
level, skole became imaginable in the human community with the emergence of an
emergent ‘‘psychoclass,’’ for which childhood—both as an experience and as a form of
subjectivity—took on a new significance (Stone 1979; deMause 1974). This shift in
affective relations with children and childhood was exemplified by the appearance of
Rousseau’s widely read Emile: Or On Education (1956/1762), which reflected a process of
reconstruction of ‘‘child’’ in the adult imaginary, and therefore a reconstruction of the
pedagogical relationship, as signaled in the very first lines of the book: ‘‘We know nothing
of childhood, and with our mistaken notions the further we advance the further we go
astray…. Nature wants children to be children before they are men… Childhood has its
ways of seeing, thinking, and feeling that are proper to it. Nothing is less sensible than to
try and substitute our ways…. The only habit the child should be allowed to acquire is to
contract none’’ (Rousseau 1956/1763, Book I, passim). Indeed, it is the aporia of childhood
declared here that could be said to inform the modern impulse to reconstruct school as a
space of adult–child dialogue.
An equally powerful originary influence on the development of democratic, dialogical
schooling for an emergent sensibility was the rise of social anarchist theory, which found
its modern voice7 in the intense, prolonged historical moment of the French Revolution and
its aftermath, for which—influenced by the organicism of Romantic philosophy of nature
and the Arminian challenge to Christian doctrines of original sin—a Hobbesian (and
Augustinian) view of human nature was contested by evolutionary principles of selforganization, self-regulation and autopoiesis. An emergent utopian social philosophy
rejected the assumption of a pre-social human nature in favor of what, as we have seen,
Bookchin describes as a ‘‘second nature,’’ which he suggest is an outgrowth of historically
and technologically mediated relationship with ‘‘first nature,’’ (2005, 413) or the natural
world. Prominent nineteenth century anarchist philosophers Pierre Proudhon and Peter
Kropotkin, in rejecting hierarchy, patriarchy and domination in any form, argued for
another ‘‘state of nature’’ than the Hobbesian ‘‘diffidence, competition, and glory’’ model,
emphasizing cooperation, ‘‘mutual aid,’’ and what Proudhon identified as ‘‘collective
reason’’ or ‘‘force’’ (Marshall 2010, 248) as fundamental evolutionary impulses. In identifying these impulses as primary ‘‘instinctual’’ tendencies,8 they drew an ontological
distinction between authoritarian and libertarian narratives at the level of human nature
itself. Hobbesian human nature is ‘‘red in tooth and claw,’’9 while for anarchist theory both
7

The word ‘‘modern’’ is used advisedly, in that this form of theory and practice is millennia old, and some
would claim a practice for which no theory was necessary in indigenous societies. For a broad historical look
at social anarchist theory and practice see Rexroth (1974) and Marshall (2010).

8

Arguments for cooperation and altruism as fundamental evolutionary impulses have been carried forward
over the last century by sociobiologists, ethologists, and evolutionary psychologists. For a recent example,
see Michael Tomasello et al. (2009).

9

William Golding’s Lord of the Flies (1954), still required reading in a multitude of US high schools, is the
commanding parable of childhood in the Hobbesian universe.
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tendencies are present. In fact anarchist theory—which Noam Chomsky identifies as an
expression of the ‘‘true intention’’ of Enlightenment ideals (Suissa 2006, 128)—refuses any
essentialist notion of human nature but rather identifies it as ‘‘twofold’’ and visible only in
a social, cultural and historical context (ibid, 28–29). Kropotkin (1972/1902) saw a
dialectical tension between the principles of struggle for existence and mutual aid, egoism
and sociability, competition and ‘‘a propensity for spontaneous cooperation and mutual aid
within human society,’’ and identified this dialectic as a driver of social evolution (Ibid 27;
Krimerman and Perry 1966, 223–237).
If this is the case, education as a social evolutionary project is not about changing
‘‘human nature’’ or installing an internal disciplinary regime in order to suppress, control or
regulate that ‘‘nature’’; rather it is about nurturing those qualities, impulses and tendencies
‘‘already present in human action’’ in the creation of an experimental cultural space that is
dedicated to the possibilities implicit in the phenomenon of neoteny—the long human
childhood and, which is the same thing, the slow, experience-dependent and therefore
unique development of each human brain, a process that takes roughly one-fifth of the
human life-cycle to complete (Montagu 1989; Bjorklund 1997). It assumes a dialectic of
personal and collective development with self-organizing, autopoietic characteristics, and
it assumes the inherent malleability, not just of the wiring of the human brain, but of
society and political life (Suissa, 119). Here, ‘‘school’’ is understood as a primary site for
the working through, on a day-to-day level, of Kropotkin’s evolutionary dialectic. It is not
a means to social transformation, but a crucial part of the transformation process itself—a
social space in which means and ends are not separated, but mutually informative (Suissa
2006, 55, 151): it is a site for worldmaking. It is quite deliberately utopian, in several
senses of the term. For one, it is not the impossible utopia, the ‘‘no place,’’ but as Marcuse
(1969) put it, ‘‘that which is blocked from coming about by the power of the established
societies’’ (4); what Buber (1958) identified as the desire to ‘‘create here and now the space
now possible for the thing for which we are striving, so that it may come to fulfillment
then’’ (13); or, as Suissa (2006) argues, a space in which ‘‘we experiment with visions of a
new political order—a process which itself constitutes an educative and motivating
experience for both educators and pupils’’ (150). It is the site in which the basic principles
of decentralization, self-government and mutual cooperation find their ‘‘smallest unit of
organization’’ (Ibid). Here school as dedicated to the encouragement of new or emergent
forms of social life is consciously understood as an embryonic democratic society, convened in a space that escapes colonization because it is just out of sight of the structures of
reproduction,
Given that childhood is under the sign of natality—that is, of the singular, and the
appearance of the new in the world (Arendt 1958)—school as skole is on that account a
shelter for creative experimentation and expression. It is a transitional psychological space,
in which the division between subjective and objective reality is negotiable (Winnicott
1971). It embodies a distinctive form of lived time and relation, associated with aesthetic
experience and with childhood temporality, which the Greeks identified as aion—‘‘eternity’’ or ‘‘timeless time’’ (Kohan 2014; Gadamer 1975)—as opposed to kronos, or linear
time. It is ‘‘free’’ time, as opposed to the lived time of economic necessity or ‘‘production,’’
and thus is associated with play in its several characteristics of a self-regulating activity
governed by an implicit goal of moderate complexity or optimal level of uncertainty and
seeking a level of flow, motivated by an intrinsic drive for competence and mastery—what
Hans Georg Gadamer, in his discussion of play (1975, 99–102), calls ‘‘transformation into
structure’’ which is in fact central to the rhythmic movement of inquiry—rather than
external reward or punishment (Bruner 1983; Erikson 1963).
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New Sensibility and Emergent Philosophy of Nature
In his discussion of the historical character of human nature—of its status as ‘‘second
nature’’—Bookchin (2005) emphasizes the extent to which this emergent historical construct of the human subject is closely connected with a felt relation to what he calls ‘‘first’’
nature—the natural world. On his account, a new sensibility would reflect a changed
subjective experience of selfhood, which would imply a changed experience of first nature,
leading to changed attitudes towards biopolitical questions about relations of human to
nonhuman, the definitions of nature and life, and by extension, about relations between the
individual and the collective, social responsibility, and the human attitude toward the
commons. Any curriculum, including a course of study based on dialogue, will reflect a
worldview in which is implicit a philosophy of both first and second nature—that is, an
understanding of self and species in relation to, not just the social but the natural world and
our place in it. Philosophical beliefs both underlie and permeate the regimes of knowledge
of what we call the ‘‘disciplines,’’ or ‘‘content areas’’—for example the concept of ‘‘alive’’
or ‘‘living’’ in the physical sciences, or of ‘‘fact’’ whether in the natural or the human
sciences, or ‘‘fair’’ in the social sciences.
A new sensibility means a new experience, not just of the human but of the non-human
world, and that new experience informs and is informed by the way we construct, individually and collectively, these primary concepts. To reconstruct the concept ‘‘alive’’ or
‘‘living’’ is in some degree to experience a new form of perception, and a reimagining of
both body-in-world and body-of-the-world. To overcome the Cartesian dichotomy between
the material and the mental on the level of sensibility is to break down on an existential
level the felt dichotomies between animal and human, sentient and non-sentient matter. A
sensibility that sees the differences between the latter as differences of degree rather than
kind implies differences of attitude towards the natural world and towards other species,
and these differences in attitude imply different behaviors. In this particular, most
important case, to overcome the Cartesian ‘‘divorce’’ between spirit/soul and matter, mind
and body, subject and object (for which see Jonas 2001/1966), given that subjectivity is a
historical process, is not necessarily a return to an earlier philosophy of nature, but the
sublation of previous positions in an emergent paradigm that is made possible and urged on
by multiple present and historical circumstances, including the growth of philosophical,
scientific and technological knowledge.
For example, the emergence in the last decade of vital materialism and posthumanism
(Bennett 2009; Braidotti 2013; Coole and Frost 2010; Bookchin 2005; Sheldrake 2009),
draw on a search for a philosophy of nature that overcomes the metaphysical dualism that
still haunts Western subjectivity. The material/mental dichotomy has allowed for, not just a
profound violation of the natural world and of other species, but that form of passive
nihilism—or what Fromm (1966) identified as ‘‘necrophily’’—implicit in the values of
global ‘‘free market’’ capitalism, for which all living and non-living beings are things
subject to appropriation, exploitation and control for purposes of profit and capital accumulation. A philosophy of nature that recognizes the agentic, transformative, inherently
intersubjective, self-organizing properties of matter, has implications for our ontological
commitments that, in turn, as argued by Coole and Frost (2010) ‘‘are… entangled with
questions of identity and history, with how we articulate the meaning of our lives, both
individual and collectively…. [T]hinking anew about the fundamental structure of matter
has far-reaching normative and existential implications’’ (6). That is, to question the categorical and exclusionary division between the inorganic and the organic, animate and
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inanimate, sentient and nonsentient, material and spiritual phenomena at the ontological
level is prelude to another way of seeing, or a new way of looking, another form of lived
experience.10

First Curricula: The Role of Art and Philosophy
The question here is, what role can school as skole play in the emergence of a knowledgeparadigm and a set of ontological persuasions concerning both ‘‘first’’ and ‘‘second’’ nature
that encourage and are encouraged by—to invoke Fromm’s other term—a ‘‘biophilic’’
sensibility—a sensibility that instinctively resists violence, hierarchy, exploitation and
domination, and whose political convictions are informed and guided by an ethos of mutual
aid and cooperation? Here there are many indirect factors to be identified, ranging from the
physical (e.g. school size, architecture, location, materials base) to the structural (organization of sub-groups, of power structure and flow, of rules of governance, degrees and
levels of autonomy, agency, personal freedom,) to the systemic (open or closed organization of space and time), many of which have been at least implicitly addressed above.11
The most visible factors, however, that suggest the ongoing reconstruction of a philosophy
of nature lie in the organization of curriculum as inquiry-based, emergent, partially individualized, integrated (that is, inter-disciplinary) dialogical (that is, based on a dialogue
between students’ and teachers’ interests), and thus oriented through aesthetic, scientific,
historical and philosophical inquiry to the interrogation of the ‘‘big’’ concepts that inform
our understanding of both first and second nature—concepts such as ‘‘alive,’’ ‘‘organism,’’
‘‘energy,’’ ‘‘matter,’’ ‘‘soul,’’ ‘‘body,’’ ‘‘part/whole,’’ not to speak of ‘‘person,’’ ‘‘mind,’’
‘‘animal,’’ and indeed ‘‘nature’’ itself. An open-structure curriculum can serve as a sort of
think tank for the emergent paradigm shift that is virtual in every inquiry.
In addition to the general principles of emergent, child–adult negotiated curriculum and
direct democratic whole-school governance,12 two forms of inquiry are, I would suggest, of
primary significance for the curriculum of the neotenic school. The first is the aesthetic, on the
assumption that art constitutes a first curriculum in the education of sensibility. Making and
observing art is in fact one of the four ‘‘impulses,’’ ‘‘instincts’’ or ‘‘interests’’ that Dewey
(1991/1902) identified in child-life—they are, we might say, the expressive organs of sensibility—and which he offered as bases for the construction of both curriculum and pedagogy.
‘‘These fourfold interests’’ he suggested—‘‘the interest in conversation or communication; in
inquiry, or finding out things; in making things, or construction; and in artistic expression—
are the natural resources, the uninvested capital, upon the exercise of which depends the
active growth of the child’’ (61). The ‘‘expressive’’ or ‘‘art instinct,’’ on his interpretation,
grows out of the ‘‘communication’’ and ‘‘constructive’’ instincts. The latter—the ‘‘instinct of
making’’ or ‘‘impulse to do,’’ first through playful movement then through the ‘‘shaping of
material into tangible form’’—when combined with the desire to communicate with an other
or to the world, leads to the work of art. And it is significant that Marcuse, in his final work
(1978), argues that the ‘‘emancipation of sensibility’’ (9), or ‘‘revolution of the instinctual
10
For a particularly well-argued, thorough and eloquent exploration of this ‘‘new way of seeing’’ the natural
world, see Abram (1996).
11
I have discussed the pedagogical, curricular and governmental dimensions of functionally dialogical
skolé in more detail in Kennedy (2014b, 2015).
12
These principles are currently best exemplified in the schools listed on the International Network of
Democratic Schools, such as Summerhill or Sudbury Valley School.
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structure’’ or ‘‘transformation of drives and needs’’ (17) upon which the emergence of the new
sensibility hinges begins in the aesthetic dimension; above all in the experience of art—both
making and experiencing—that ‘‘shatters everyday experience and anticipates a different
reality principle’’ (19). ‘‘Art,’’ he claims, is a utopian impulse that ‘‘challenges the monopoly
of the established reality to determine what is ‘real.’… [T]he world formed by art is recognized as a reality which is suppressed and distorted in the given reality’’ (6, 22). As such, it is
the prophetic manifestation of ‘‘another reason, another sensibility, which defy the rationality
and sensibility incorporated in the dominant social institutions’’ (7). The work of art represents another world, emerging through the hand of the child artist, which, projected by her
own making into an object or event, confronts her with a meaning beyond her own inchoate
intention, and in creating that space between the two, is intrinsically pedagogical. And as
Herbert Read (in Woodcock 1977) argued, the practice of art is, unlike reading writing and
arithmetic, a ‘‘natural discipline…. a discipline imposed by the tool and the material’’ through
which skill is developed, not through the application of an alien technique, but through an
‘‘integration of the senses’’ (284) in the actual embodied, reciprocal, multi-sensory formative
interaction with the world. As such, the neotenic school would provide an abundance of
materials, time and encouragement for art-expression and art appreciation, including the
plastic arts, music, dance, drama, poetry and craft.
Second, in a child–adult collective implicitly committed to epistemological reconstruction through the interrogation of those common, central and contestable concepts (‘‘living,’’
‘‘fact,’’ ‘‘measurement,’’ ‘‘number,’’ ‘‘infinity,’’ ‘‘language,’’ ‘‘body,’’ etc.) underlying the
disciplines—which is the evolutionary gift that ‘‘free time’’ allows—Dewey’s instinct or
impulse of inquiry plays a major role. The impulse emerges, he suggests, from a combination
of the constructive impulse with the conversational instinct. The role of communal philosophical dialogue is particularly important in this interrogation, for it is here that children and
adults can engage together in their ongoing reconstruction of those concepts, driven forward
by the encounter between multiple points of view and the felt need for a coordination of
perspectives that this encounter creates. The regular practice of community of philosophical
inquiry (for which see Lipman et al. 1980) represents a sort of ur-discourse—the constant
self-organizing modeling of an ideal speech situation—the deliberative organon of the
ekklesia or assembly of the intentional community of skole. Here, our deeper ontological and
epistemological assumptions are interrogated through dialogue, and another level of
awareness—the metacognitive—becomes available to us as individuals and as a group. Here
the skills and habits of deliberative dialogue are applied both to philosophical issues and to
issues of governance, in the regular practice of the weekly whole-school meeting characteristic of schools of the democratic education movement. A group inquiry triggered by the
question ‘‘what is power,’’ for example, is both mirrored and exemplified by a meeting
devoted to a specific disciplinary issue within the community.

Conclusions
Skole is a microcosm, a workshop—an experiment in living and a space for the conscious
practice of democratic governance in all areas, including the negotiation of curriculum. It
assumes sociability as a general human principle, and the dialectic of lived difference and
repetition as intrinsically informed by a principle of spontaneous and emergent order. For
anarchist theory, this form of schooling is a vanguard space in the basic social and political
unit of the decentralized ‘‘commune’’ (Suissa, 48). It begins with a commitment to social
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equality, freedom from coercion, individual agency, respect as a principal of interaction,
and active, participatory self-government (Ibid, 104, 127). The question whether its
principles and practices can be applied to public schooling breaks down, in my opinion to
two, the answer to one of which is obvious to me, and the other uncertain. First, were we to
limit the size of all publically funded schools to 100 students at most, fix the ratio of adults
to children at 1:12, discontinue all forms of standardized assessment, dismantle administrative hierarchy, assume local autonomy, raise teachers’ salaries and invest in the design
of functionally and aesthetically harmonious, pedagogically intelligent buildings, we
would see an almost immediate emergence of the elements of skole.13 This response is
based on the principle, which I have argued elsewhere (Kennedy, forthcoming) that skole is
in fact an archetypal phenomenon in the sense of a species-wide expression of the possibilities inherent in the relationship between two or more generations in the setting of an
adult–child collective, or intentional community, based on a cultural evolutionary ideal,
which is social and cultural transformation through intergenerational encounter. On this
argument, to create the basic material conditions—conditions that allow for and encourage
the exercise of the criteria of anarchist practice—decentralization, self-government,
absence of hierarchy and mutual cooperation—is more than half the battle.
On the other hand, can a historical institution that is steeped from its very origins in the
rise of the modern nation state in centralization, hierarchy, patriarchy, indoctrination,
bureaucracy, normalization, and systemic teacher and child disempowerment—in short, a
full-fledged ideological state apparatus—do anything but implicitly reject the basic principles of skole? The history of the Progressive education movement in the US provides us
with an admonitory example. The original impulse of the movement was informed by a
century of dialogue-based innovations—whether Pestalozzi, Froebel, Francis Parker,
Montessori, Caroline Pratt or Celestin Freinet—to name only a handful of those which
have survived in the historical record. In the US, those educational impulses became part of
the more general movement of social reform called Progressivism, triggered in 1902 by
Dewey’s (1991/1902) call for a solution to the ‘‘fundamental opposition’’ between ‘‘child’’
and ‘‘curriculum.’’ This challenge led to a small wave of experimental and adventurous
public schools that incorporated dimensions of anarcho-socialist social principles and
dialogic practices of skole summed up in the term ‘‘child-centered’’—all of them motivated, I would add, by the increasing influence of what Lloyd deMause (1974), in his
theory of the historical evolution of child rearing modes, called the ‘‘empathic’’ or
‘‘helping’’ mode, both producer and product of an emergent psychoclass associated with
democratic social character. While some progressive precepts and practices found their
way into public education over the course of the first half of the twentieth century (Cremin
1961; Semel and Sadovnik 1999), they were always fodder for the interminable US culture
wars, and were coopted by both the left and the right—whether in the corporate capitalistinspired ‘‘scientific management’’/’’social efficiency’’ movements, or in the frankly
indoctrinatory Marxist ‘‘social reconstruction’’ movement, and eventually discredited
altogether in the anti-communist paranoia of the 1950’s, through which the national
security state strengthened its hegemonic grip on public education as a weapon of state.
Meanwhile, the more directly left-libertarian educational ventures, many of them associated with actual intentional communities—whether the Ferrer School, Stelton, Mohegan—
or the notorious Summerhill in the UK, initiator of a movement that was reborn in the

13
For those who consider this a ‘‘utopian’’ ideal, keep in mind that in fiscal year 2015, US military spending
was projected to account for 54 % of all federal discretionary spending, a total of $598.5 billion.
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1960’s in the ‘‘free school’’ movement, became almost exclusively associated with a
culturally and politically radical counter-culture (Avrich 2006; Vesey 1973).
Applying these two responses—one phenomenological and one historical—to the
question of the possibility of a public school culture dedicated to the emergence of the
democratic social character leaves us in aporia. If we believe, with deMause, that the
emergence of an empathic child-rearing psychoclass is a dialectical evolutionary phenomenon, and that dialogical relations with children and childhood will increasingly
become the culturally privileged attitude among adults, then we can at least speculate that
the material conditions for the emergence of skole mentioned above will become more and
more common. If, on the other hand, an un-reconstructed state maintains the public schools
in a conditon of abjection through hierarchy, bureaucratization, and misplaced professionalism, combined with the dramatic underfunding that makes those material conditions
impossible, then we can expect more of the same. Furthermore, it may be naı̈ve to assume
that a change in subjectivity alone will lead to changes in social, economic and political
structures—it takes relatively few scoundrels and their hired thugs to rule over a nation, not
to speak of those who are in love with their chains. But as I have argued, the democratic
sensibility is in fact already available to the species, has emerged in various cultural and
political forms in multiple secular and religious movements and at various levels of
development and awareness, and has always had its prophets, activists and saints (Marshall
2010). More specifically, skolé has manifested repeatedly in the history of schooling, from
the still vibrant Danish Folk School Movement, to Tolstoy’s Yasnaya Polyana, to the
Modern School Movement (Avrich 2006), to the Alternative Schools Movement of the
1960’s and 70’s, to Reggio Emilia and the Emergent Curriculum movement (Wien 2008;
Jones 2012) and to Summerhill and the contemporary Democratic School Movement.14
These manifestations are only utopian in Marcuse’s sense of the term—as examples of a
world of which stubborn structural traditions and social habits of hierarchy, patriarchy and
domination prevent the emergence. As adult–child collectives, they are works in progress,
and examples of solutions to the problems, paradoxes, contradictions and conflicts that
Dewey so pointedly identified in his critiques (1991/1902, 1938) of both purely childcentered and adult-centered education. All, however, are based on the principle of dialogue, which, on this account, is the interpersonal, communicative, discursive and ethical
basis for the emergence of democratic sensibilities. As such, they exemplify the utopian
space where natality is recognized as a fundamental cultural force, and where the evolutionary possibilities inherent in neoteny are taken as normative.
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